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BOOK REVIEWS

WHAT IS THE KEY TO VICTORY?
Desch, Michael C. Power and Military Effectiveness: The Fallacy of Democratic Triumphalism. Baltimore,
Md.: Johns Hopkins Univ. Press, 2008. 232pp. $45

The notion that “democracies don’t
fight one another” is well known, but
recently some scholars have made a
stronger claim—that when democracies
do fight wars, their battlefield effectiveness is far greater than that of nondemocracies with comparable technology
and training.
Michael Desch challenges the supposed
military prowess of democracies in his
book Power and Military Effectiveness:
The Fallacy of Democratic Triumphalism. Desch, a political scientist, holds
the Robert M. Gates Chair in Intelligence and National Security DecisionMaking at Texas A&M University and is
an authority on civil-military relations.
His past work argues that it is strategic
interests, not regime types, that determine a nation’s security policy. His latest book extends that theme by
delivering a convincing rebuttal to what
he calls the “democratic triumphalists.”
The case of the “triumphalists” rests
upon statistical analyses showing that
democracies have been more likely to
win wars than other political systems
over the last two hundred years. Desch
challenges these studies head on,
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arguing that in most cases the democracies in question would have been expected to win in any case, due to
traditional military advantages (the
United States in the 1991 Gulf war) or
to motivation, national survival being
on the line (Israel in 1973), and that in
other cases there may have been errors
and uncertainties in the data sets themselves. To prove his point, Desch offers
four case studies: the Russo-Polish War
(1919–20), the battle for France (1940),
the Falklands War (1982), and Israel’s
wars from 1948 to 1982. These case
studies trace the details of governmental decision making and the military
operations of each conflict, showing
that the factors identified by the
triumphalists were not the key drivers
of battlefield outcomes.
The combination of quantitative analysis and case studies is notable. Few authors are comfortable working in both
methods, but Desch demonstrates both
methodological sophistication and a
command of military history. However,
one might ask for a more thorough exploration of a few issues. One example
is how quick Desch is to dismiss the
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possibility that democracies grow faster
economically than other regimes and
thus accumulate more resources in the
long run. Such questions are minor,
though, and the overall case is quite
persuasive.
This book is a must for scholars of military effectiveness or civil-military relations. The statistical sections will satisfy
researchers; they might be a bit difficult
for general readers, but overall the work
should interest a broad audience of national security professionals. Desch’s
writing is excellent throughout, with
lively case studies and clear explanations of his theories and results.
One hopes that policy makers will read
this book. As Desch notes, democratic
triumphalism has become popular in
Washington. The mistaken belief that
democracy itself is a “force multiplier”
could lead officials to underestimate the
risks of U.S. interventions or to encourage unduly weak but democratic U.S.
allies. Desch offers a warning that it is
superior strategy, resources, and skill,
not the magic bullet of democracy, that
remain the keys to victory.
DAVID BURBACH

Naval War College

Doyle, Michael. Striking First: Preemption and
Prevention in International Conflict. Princeton,
N.J.: Princeton Univ. Press, 2008. 200pp. $24.95

Even before the United States and its allies embarked on war in Iraq in 2003,
the question of whether it is acceptable
to strike enemies without clear provocation was an increasingly vexing one to
policy makers, academics, and legal experts. “Preemptive war” (attacking an
enemy who is clearly about to strike
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you first) has always been an acceptable
response to a dire and clear threat. But
“preventive war” (striking a potential
enemy while circumstances are favorable to the attacker, or striking in early
anticipation of a possible, or even only
theoretical, threat) has traditionally
been regarded in the international
community as not only unwise but
immoral.
In this slim, tightly reasoned volume,
one of America’s foremost foreignpolicy thinkers tackles the problem of
preventive war and reaches surprising
conclusions. While rejecting the
so-called Bush Doctrine, which putatively grants to the United States almost
unlimited permission to attack almost
any threat in any form, Doyle delivers a
clear warning that the previous rules of
war do not apply in the twenty-first
century. Doyle struggles (as have other
scholars in many nations over the past
decade) to find criteria that would allow preventive attacks in an internationally acceptable framework. He
settles on four criteria: lethality, likelihood, legitimacy, and legality.
The book is actually a collection of essays by four other scholars, who supply
a foreword and criticism of Doyle’s
chapters, to which Doyle responds in a
conclusion. The debate format is lively
and makes this work a particularly useful tool for introducing students at advanced levels to the subject.
Although Doyle’s prose is direct and
clear, in places he makes overly structured arguments, and his attempt to set
his four criteria into a matrix produces
something more like a rigid template.
Doyle certainly recognizes that the perception of a threat, versus the actual
threat, is often idiosyncratic and affected by a slew of factors, but his
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criteria are more likely to make sense
after the fact than at the outset of action. The moral questions he raises are,
and should be, crucial to policy makers,
but his framework is more suitable as
an after-action analysis than as a guide
to preventive attack.
That said, Striking First is an excellent,
thought-provoking, and highly readable
volume, indispensable for both specialists and interested general readers. No
future discussions of this problem (and
there will be many) can afford to ignore
Michael Doyle’s contribution.
THOMAS NICHOLS

Naval War College

Mahnken, Thomas G., and Joseph A. Maiolo, eds.
Strategic Studies: A Reader. New York: Routledge,
2008. 464pp. $49.95

Tom Mahnken and Joseph Maiolo will
not be unfamiliar to readers of the Naval War College Review or to students of
strategy and policy. Mahnken, a former
professor at the Naval War College, is
currently visiting fellow and professorial lecturer in the Strategic Studies Program at the Johns Hopkins University
Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies; Maiolo is a senior
lecturer in war studies at King’s College
London. Seeking to enhance the teaching of this important subject, Mahnken
and Maiolo have put together a collection of previously published essays on
the theory and practice of strategic
studies.
This collection is wide ranging, both
topically and chronologically. It begins
by examining the uses of strategic theory, with essays by Bernard Brodie,
Lawrence Freedman, and William C.
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Fuller, Jr. The second section examines
the “classics,” with selections from Sun
Tzu, Basil Liddell Hart, and Thomas
Schelling. A look at conventional warfare on land, sea, and air is found in the
third section, in articles by Richard
Overy, Brian Holden Reid (on J. F. C.
Fuller), and Daniel Byman and Matthew Waxman on airpower in Kosovo,
along with a selection of Julian
Corbett’s Some Principles of Maritime
Strategy. Nuclear strategy is not neglected, with a selection from Bernard
Brodie’s The Absolute Weapon and Albert Wohlstetter’s famous article “Delicate Balance of Terror.” The fifth, and
by far the largest, section is on irregular
warfare and small wars. The essays here
are both new and old classics: T. E.
Lawrence, Mao Tse-tung, David Galula,
David Kilcullen, Andrew Mack (on big
nations losing small wars), and Peter
Neumann and M. L. R. Smith (on strategic terrorism). To conclude, there are
essays by Andrew Krepinevich, Michael
Evans, Colin Gray, Adam Roberts, and
Hew Strachan (all since 2003), which
engage the future of conflict and of
strategy making.
One should not quibble too much with
the editors’ selections (or omissions);
Mahnken and Maiolo acknowledge
from the outset that space prevented
them from including all they wished.
Still, some readers may question the description of strategy that Mahnken and
Maiolo offer in their introduction. By
strategy they largely mean military,
rather than national or grand, strategy,
but they do not specify. In a collection
such as this, a more precise explanation
of strategy at the beginning would have
been helpful for framing the collection’s
essays. Nonetheless, this text will be extremely useful as a starting point for
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professional military education on this
topic. The editors are to be
commended.
JONATHAN WINKLER

Wright State University
Dayton, Ohio

Stavridis, James. Destroyer Captain: Lessons of a
First Command. Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute
Press, 2008. 224pp. $22.95

The politically correct aspiration for all
surface warfare officers is to attain to
command at sea. Realistically, these officers cannot begin to comprehend all
its ramifications, but they viscerally
know it is the Holy Grail. Reading Admiral Jim Stavridis’s Destroyer Captain
is about as close as these officers will
come to enjoying the ride until they actually receive their orders to command.
It is our great fortune that thencommander Stavridis scrupulously kept
a journal during his days aboard USS
Barry (DDG 52) (1993–95) and has offered to share his experiences with us.
James Stavridis is prolific on this subject, having written extensively on life at
sea for the naval professional. Such earlier works as Watch Officer’s Guide (editor, 1999) and Command at Sea (with
William Mack, 1999) now serve as textbooks. Destroyer Captain, however, is
designed to be a good read for anyone
fascinated with what life is like behind
the doors of the captain’s cabin. Fortunately, Stavridis is a writer who is not
only good with the small details of daily
life but shares a sense of history and
awe of the sea. Simply, he is in love with
command at sea, and you feel it
throughout the entire book.
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Stavridis does not purport to tell new
destroyer skippers that there is one correct way to succeed at their job, but he
has tried to keep to the basics. The
“ends” are mandated: the ship should
be ready for war. The “means” is where
a captain’s personality turns seemingly
identical structures into radically different habitats. Stavridis adheres to simplicity. Serve good food. Walk around.
Have a plan. Smile.
Stavridis, currently the regional combatant commander of Southern Command, was the second skipper of Barry.
His predecessor, today Admiral Gary
Roughead, is the Chief of Naval
Operations.
A particularly poignant piece is his account of the tragic death of Admiral Jay
Prout, a friend and mentor and always
an ebullient companion. Prout had a
trademark of passing to friends en route
to command a paperback about the exploits of a Royal Navy destroyer skipper
who had three ships shot out from under him during the Second World War.
He called that book motivation for a
successful command. We can place Destroyer Captain on the same list.
TOM FEDYSZYN

Naval War College

Cliff, Roger, et al. Entering the Dragon’s Lair: Chinese Antiaccess Strategies and Their Implications
for the United States. Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND,
2007. 154pp. $27.50

This study has already attracted widespread attention from the policy community and media, for good reason.
The U.S. military appears poised to face
challenges to its ability to maintain access to a variety of regional littoral
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areas, such as in the Persian Gulf. It is
time for American planners to view the
rising antiaccess challenge as part of a
global problem that may require significant restructuring of U.S. platforms,
deployment, diplomacy, and even, in a
worst case, strategy and tactics.
The authors have produced the first
major study that evaluates comprehensively the specific antiaccess methods
being discussed by Chinese military
strategists. They bring to bear a wide
variety of relevant doctrinal and analytic materials (many of which they
themselves have translated) and explain
clearly their relative authority. The authors’ conclusion is sobering: in the unfortunate event of a Taiwan Strait
conflict, China’s military may consider
launching a rapid surprise attack. Such
a first strike could damage and render
ineffective a wide variety of U.S. military platforms (aircraft carrier strike
groups—which are described as having
special vulnerabilities—and assets at regional bases). This could deny U.S.
forces effective “access” to sea and air
space to China’s east, leaving Taiwan
vulnerable to military coercion and
testing American resolve. The authors
term this growing zone “the Dragon’s
Lair.” While the United States would
retain significant military forces regardless of the outcome of such a conflict,
China might be able to achieve specific
military and political objectives at
America’s expense.
An enduring challenge for analyses of
the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) is
distinguishing between aspirations and
capabilities. The authors do their best
to differentiate between the two, and
they deserve great credit for addressing
seriously a set of issues on which there
has been insufficient open analysis.
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While the continued lack of transparency makes it difficult to determine the
PLA’s precise capabilities, longestablished technical expertise and focus on the development of such weapons as missiles and related technologies
suggest considerable potential on
China’s part. The authors offer, in light
of their findings, a wide variety of specific policy recommendations, which
should be considered carefully. However, the expense, difficulties (largely
because of inherent physics-based limitations), and side effects potentially associated with some of them—and
indeed the ruinous nature of any
U.S.-China conflict—make it vital to
consider the larger strategic context as
well.
Conflict over Taiwan is the only readily
imaginable scenario in which the
United States and China could have a
kinetic military exchange today. This
unfortunate contingency, already only a
remote one, has been rendered more so
by the March 2008 Taiwan election and
President Ma Ying-jeou’s constructive
approach to cross-strait relations. Continued U.S. presence and influence in
strategic regions of East Asia, which
Beijing has not challenged directly in
public, will remain an important subject for American policy makers, as well
as for bilateral and multilateral discussion. Even as the two nations cooperate,
there will undoubtedly be areas of contention. But there is no reason at this
point to fear that war is imminent, and
every reason to believe that each side’s
coercive capabilities can deter the outcome that each most fears.
ANDREW ERICKSON

Naval War College
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each chapter Cole examines each issue
on a country-by-country basis.
Cole, Bernard D. Sea Lanes and Pipelines: Energy
Security in Asia. Westport, Conn.: Greenwood,
2008. 280pp. $75

This book, written by a retired Navy
captain and professor of international
history at the National War College,
provides an up-to-date summary of the
movement of energy resources in and
around Asia, of the concurrent buildup
of naval power in the region to protect
that movement, and of strategies employed by Asian nations to ensure the
safe and secure transport of energy
resources.
Bernard Cole is well versed on the subject, drawing upon his thirty-year naval
career, all served in the Pacific, and his
obvious focus and research on naval
and energy issues in Asia. His extensive
notes and bibliography constitute almost a fourth of the book, showing the
breadth and width of Cole’s research
and sources.
While the title implies a focus on both
sea-lanes and pipelines, actually more
time and space are allocated to maritime issues. Cole explains in his introduction that “no form of transporting
oil is more important than the sea” and
that “the role of naval force on the seas
provides the primary vehicle from
which the question of the military security of Asia’s energy supplies is viewed.”
Conceding that energy security cannot
be addressed individually for each nation, Cole recognizes globalization as a
fact of life and thus holds that the transport of energy via sea-lanes, “the commons,” must be addressed from a
regional perspective—in this case, that
of Asia. The book is divided into chapters specifically by issues, and within
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Cole builds issue upon issue, to include
the geography of the region and the resultant physical problem of the secure
sea lines of communication; the energy
sources within Asia; and the problems
of transporting energy to and from
there. He ends with a look at multilateralism and various international organizations that may influence maritime issues in Asia, as well as a profile of
individual countries and their anticipated changes vis-à-vis energy security
and freedom of the seas.
The previously mentioned “up-to-date
summary” lends a time-sensitive nature
to the book. Cole takes the time to explain the necessary background and history, but he is quite aware that the value
of current data is subject to atrophy as
time passes. An update will certainly be
warranted in a couple of years if this
book is to remain relevant.
JAMES P. LEWIS

Naval War College

Lawrence, Quil. Invisible Nation: How the Kurds’
Quest for Statehood Is Shaping Iraq and the Middle
East. New York: Walker, 2008. 288pp. $25.95
Marcus, Aliza. Blood and Belief: The PKK and the
Kurdish Fight for Independence. New York: New
York Univ. Press, 2007. 368pp. $35

While the establishment of the nationstate as the preeminent system for political and social integration has led to the
benefit of many social groups, it has led
to the disaffection of others. The Kurds,
who for centuries have acted as political
pawns and mercenaries, have arguably
benefited the least. Even now, with a
population estimated at twenty-eight
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million, the Kurds remain divided
among four separate countries—northern Iraq, northeastern Syria, southeast
Turkey, and western Iran.
Literature on the Kurds is extensive,
and, as suggested from the publication
of the books reviewed here, it is likely to
grow. What that means in terms of
greater visibility for the Kurds or the
enhancement of their rights remains to
be seen. If the pen is indeed mightier
than the sword, Kurdophiles will welcome any expansion of their documented trials and tribulations, which
date back to the early 1800s.
Invisible Nation focuses on the Kurds’
experience in Iraq, with particular attention to their plight under Saddam
Hussein and to their role in constructing a democratic Iraq, post–Saddam
and the Baathists. The implicit question
is whether Kurdistan is, or will ever be,
an independent country, de facto or de
jure. Lawrence’s chronology of events
touches upon various aspects of the
problem, such as the long-standing
party factionalism among Iraqi Kurds
(Talabani’s PUK versus Barzani’s KDP)
and a wide array of cabals and conspiracies with Iraq’s other social groups
(Sunni Arabs, Shiite Arabs, Assyrians,
Turkomans) and neighbors. Following
a brief introduction to Kurdish history,
Lawrence moves quickly to the middle
of the twentieth century, where the
reader learns details of the Kurdish
struggle for self-determination, whether
as part of an independent Kurdistan or
an autonomous region within Iraq.
Lawrence is an excellent writer, but his
depiction of events seems at times anecdotal, based on his trips to Kurdistan as
a reporter and on his sampling of informants. Contributing to that feel is what
appears to be arbitrary footnoting of

Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2009

153

sources and declarations. Yet the book
flows nicely and offers insight from diverse elements of Kurdish society.
Blood and Belief is a different kind of
book altogether. It too follows a chronological approach, but its time span is
shorter and its topic—the creation and
evolution of the PKK (Kurdish Workers’ Party)—is much narrower. More a
social movement than a political party,
the PKK was established to bring recognition, if not outright independence, to
Kurds living in Turkey. While the PKK
grew out of Kurdish nationalism, however, its roots were in leftist revolutionary traditions.
Marcus begins with the 1978 gathering
in southeast Turkey where the PKK was
founded and then tracks its development, principally through the personal
history of its longtime leader Abdullah
Ocalan. That might seem strange, but it
is difficult to separate the party from its
leader, since Ocalan has led the party
and has been its driving force from the
start. Yet as Marcus frequently points
out, Ocalan’s position as leader has
come at a high cost, because of his consolidation of power both within the
PKK and against competing parties.
Marcus’s story leads to the conclusion
that Ocalan’s need for absolute control
produced not only several purges but
poor and inflexible strategies. Too often
suggestions for making the PKK more
effective were dealt with by Ocalan as
threats to his leadership and authority.
Using data from “close to 100” interviewees, Marcus explains how the PKK
evolved until Ocalan’s capture in 1999.
The intrigue behind that event is by itself worth the price of the book. The
depth of Marcus’s reporting on the
PKK’s early years is unfortunately offset
by the brevity of her coverage of events
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since Ocalan’s arrest. Although she does
include a convenient time line, an index
of the principal players and informants
would have been a valuable aid to the
reader.
Blood and Belief will be of interest not
only to scholars of Kurdish and Turkish
history but to anyone interested in the
development of political movements
and parties and in how power is consolidated. Invisible Nation offers an excellent, readable overview of the Kurdish
experience in Iraq, especially since the
Gulf war of 1991. These books document two different approaches taken by
a social group long oppressed. Both
raise questions about the cost and feasibility of self-determination, given the
growing permeability of national
boundaries. Another issue is the viability of using terrorism as a way to get
recognition or press for one’s rights,
however legitimate they may seem. A
lesson for national leaders is that the
more you deny the identity of a social
group (for years the government of
Turkey claimed there were no Kurds,
only mountain Turks) and its right to
self-expression, the more you sow the
seeds for insurrection and rebellion.
Despite their geopolitical separation,
which contributes to the tendency to
collude with or against each other, the
future for the Kurds seems brighter
than ever. Marcus shows that they can
organize themselves effectively, while
Lawrence suggests that with autonomy
and better economic times, historical
animosities can be set aside. Both authors have added pages to Kurdish
history.
ANTHONY DIBELLA

Naval War College
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Ebadi, Shirin. Iran Awakening: One Woman’s
Journey to Reclaim Her Life and Country. New
York: Random House, 2007. 256pp. $14.95
Nasr, Vali. The Shia Revival: How Conflicts within
Islam Will Shape the Future. New York: W. W.
Norton, 2007. 240pp. $14.95

Since the 1979 Islamic Revolution, Iran
has posed a serious dilemma for regional and global peace and security.
Today, Iran is more perplexing and ominous than ever, thanks to President
Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s threatening
rants and Iran’s supposed nuclear
ambitions.
Two books about Iran and Shiism are
must reads to understand better the
current dilemma in the Middle East and
its ramifications for global security. Nobel Peace Prize laureate Shirin Ebadi’s
autobiography Iran Awakening and Vali
Nasr’s The Shia Revival provide unique
insights and analyses of the powerhungry clerics ruling Iran and of the
Sunni-versus-Shia paradigm.
Shirin Ebadi’s personal story about her
upbringing in Iran, first under Shah
Pahlavi and then under the Islamic Revolution that brought Ayatollah
Khomeini to power, is captivating. Each
chapter contains shocking developments, but nothing grabs the reader
more than the prologue, in which she
describes her surreal discovery that she
is next on the revolutionary clerics’ hit
list. The Shia revolutionary paradigm
that evolved in Khomeini’s Iran proved
as repressive and brutal as the shah’s
reign. Particularly bewildering was the
Shia messianic belief in the return of
the Mahdi—the “hidden imam”—
whose arrival would be preceded by the
apocalypse. Equally provocative is the
nearly hypnotic religious fervor with
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which the Shia sought martyrdom, especially when they fought Saddam
Hussein during the Iran-Iraq War
(1980–88). The scale of destruction and
loss of human life was staggering, yet
Iranians volunteered to fill the front
lines in droves. Shirin Ebadi vividly describes these strange, violent events, as
well as the ideological earthquakes in
Iran and the state of fear that pervaded
the very air people breathed.
As a human-rights lawyer, Shirin Ebadi
has taken on cases that were extremely
perilous to her and her colleagues. She
has particularly involved herself in cases
of gross violations against women and
children. Both men and women, young
and old, underwent torture, disappeared, or languished in Iranian prisons. Extrajudicial executions and
assassinations were not uncommon. In
2003 Shirin Ebadi was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize. In chapter 12 she describes her strange elation in being
chosen, and how her fellow Iranians reacted—the authorities were unhappy,
but the people, especially the women,
were ecstatic. Today, Shirin Ebadi continues to work as a human-rights lawyer in Iran, despite continuous threats
to her life.
Vali Nasr’s book illustrates the patterns
of conflicts between Shias and Sunnis
throughout Islamic history. In The Shia
Revival he explains how he believes
these patterns will continue to shape regional politics in the Middle East and
South Asia. It is a book to which U.S.
policy makers, military, and intelligence
groups should pay close attention. Nasr
has the ability to do something that
probably no other “analyst” has
done—to explain the mind-set of the
Sunni and Shia leaders and their followers, and why they have such deeply
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emotive sentiments about themselves
and resentments toward each other.
These sentiments and resentments,
Nasr is convinced, are affecting politics
in post-Saddam Iraq and have ramifications for regional and global security.
The book’s subtitle states his theory
that it is the many conflicts within Islam that will shape the future. All we
need to do is look at what is happening
in Iraq, and other parts of the Islamic
world, to see that this is true.
The Sunni-Shia rivalry is as old as Islam
itself. Today, for military and security
strategy purposes, it is especially important to understand the political,
sociocultural, religious, historical, and
even economic variables affecting the
Sunnis and Shias. For example, the
Shias tipped the balance of power when
they ruled the Islamic empire during
the Fatimid dynasty. However, the
Fatimids were not successful in expelling the crusaders from Jerusalem. The
Sunnis stepped in and victoriously
fought the crusaders, eventually tipping
the balance of power back into their
hands.
The Sunnis and Shias fear that the same
power struggle will take place today in
Iraq. This time, it is the Americans who
invaded Iraq, providing the opportunity for the Sunnis and Shias to play the
power game once again. In the long
run, global peace and security are at
stake.
HAYAT ALVI-AZIZ

Naval War College
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Crile, George. Charlie Wilson’s War: The Extraordinary Story of How the Wildest Man in Congress
and a Rogue CIA Agent Changed the History of Our
Times. New York: Grove, 2004. 560pp. $14.95

A longtime best seller in its tenth printing, this important book received a
boost in December 2007 when the popular movie of the same name brought
this story—CIA’s secret proxy war in
Afghanistan against the Soviet Union—
to the big screen. Crile’s painstaking account of the complex chain of events
and of the powerful personalities that
produced the most successful covert
war in U.S. history is the result of extensive research, countless interviews,
travel, and personal interaction with
most of the key characters in this reallife drama. Over a period of fifteen
years of research and reporting, George
Crile traveled repeatedly to Afghanistan, Pakistan, Russia, Saudi Arabia,
Iraq, Kuwait, and Israel and throughout
the United States to interview the many
who played prominently in bringing
about the Afghan mujahideen victory
over the Soviet Union’s Red Army in
early 1989.
Reading more like a good spy novel
than the historical and factual piece of
reporting that it is, the book takes the
reader through the fascinating story of
how the CIA gained support and
achieved victory due, in large measure,
to the backing and behind-the-scenes
political and relationship maneuverings
of Texas congressman Charlie Wilson
and CIA operative Gust Avrakotos. The
extensive cast of characters includes
many other prominent figures in the
U.S. government; Texas society; and the
governments and intelligence services
of Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and
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Israel. The author’s source notes at the
end of the book give a sense of the
grand scope of this story, which is still
playing out today.
Crile’s career, spanning thirty years
with CBS, most notably as a producer
for 60 Minutes and 60 Minutes II, positioned him to be a part of this epic as it
unfolded. A two-time winner of the Edgar R. Murrow Award for broadcast
journalism, he shows his penchant for
bringing a complex story to the reader
in an evocative, entertaining, and compelling way.
For students of national-security decision making, foreign policy, U.S. and
international politics, and the processes
that ultimately result in decisive action,
this book provides an insight into how
things really transpired during the Reagan administration’s support of the
Afghan freedom fighters. The author’s
epilogue, a valuable resource for the
student interested in the history and effects of this period, examines the longterm unintended consequences of both
U.S. support and periods of nonsupport
over four presidential administrations.
Some of these consequences include the
current negative opinion of the United
States in the Muslim world, the rise of
radical Islam, the attacks of September
11, 2001, and our ongoing conflicts in
both Afghanistan and Iraq.
George Crile passed away in 2006. Although he did not live to see his story
come to life as a full-length motion picture, he would probably have been
pleased to see the renewed interest and
intellectual curiosity that the film has
brought to his important chronicle of a
pivotal time in our history. There are
countless lessons and insights here for
national security professionals and
those interested in the messy processes
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and decisions that result in worldchanging events.
GENE MILOWICKI

Naval War College

Dugard, Martin. The Training Ground: Grant,
Lee, Sherman, and Davis in the Mexican War,
1846–1848. New York: Little, Brown, 2008.
446pp. $29.99

The English novelist C. S. Forester once
observed, concerning soldiers in war,
that it was a “coincidence that when
destiny had so much to do she should
find tools of such high quality ready to
hand.” This comment aptly describes
the human story line woven throughout
The Training Ground, Martin Dugard’s
spirited and nearly blow-by-blow account of the major battles of the Mexican War. Dugard, author of The Last
Voyage of Columbus (2005), has written
a robust narrative of this conflict describing President James K. Polk’s ambition to expand the territory of the
United States. Reaching beyond the formal history, Dugard uses the strong
personalities, individual battlefield accomplishments, and close relationships
among a small group of professional
soldiers who actually fought the war to
bring his story to life.
These soldiers, West Point graduates
and well-drilled junior officers in a
meager U.S. Army, were the human
tools “ready to hand” in 1846. Ulysses
S. Grant, Robert E. Lee, William
Sherman, Jefferson Davis, Thomas J.
“Stonewall” Jackson, and others with
names remembered today were first exposed to the hardships and brutality of
warfare in the conflict with Mexico.
The experience gained in combat tactics, engineering, and logistics by this
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“brotherhood” hardened its veterans
and taught them to lead, lessons that
would be evident during the much
more horrific bloodshed that was to
take place in the U.S. Civil War.
Dugard relates numerous stories of
these young officers and their friendships: of Lee assisted by a young George
McClellan and supported by Jackson’s
mobile gun batteries; “Sam” Grant and
Davis charging together into battle;
“Pete” (actually James) Longstreet serving as best man at Grant’s postwar wedding; the calmness of Grant and his
keen battlefield observation under fire;
the savagery of Jackson’s energy; the
frustration of Sherman while posted in
California; and the courageous, almost
supernatural, professionalism of Lee.
In the end, Mexico City and Mexico
were conquered, and the Treaty of
Guadalupe Hidalgo, signed in July
1848, ended the war. Mexico lost vast
portions of its northern states, including California, while the still-young
United States nearly doubled in size.
The spare and honest Grant wrote of
his experiences in Mexico, “I would like
to see a truthful history written. Such a
history will do full credit to the courage, endurance, and soldierly ability of
the American citizen, no matter what
section of the country he hailed from,
or in what ranks he fought.” As
Dugard’s brisk and engrossing story
forecasts, the competence of this small
brotherhood would be put to the fullest
test during the long and bitter conflict
between the states. This later war was
fought with great determination and violence by the men whom destiny had
trained on the same ground—the West
Point veterans of the Mexican War.
WILLIAM CALHOUN

Naval War College
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